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some national regulation over the bars of each state. He appears to advocate
appropriations of public funds to a quasi-public body similar to library boards
or port authorities, which could be representative of the court, the organized
bar and the general public. He would also like to see implementation of the
Poor Litigants Statute, a proposal which dates back to 1924.
In summarizing the problem of financing generally, he concludes that "If
Legal Aid Officers and attorneys in private practice could both receive re-
imbursement from public funds, in proper cases and under suitable safeguards,
for necessary court work carried on in behalf of persons unable to pay
attorneys' fees, it would relieve materially the financial burden on private
resources." My quarrel here is with the apparent assumption that the primary
source should be private sources. In view of the large sums which, I am con-
vinced, an accurate study of need would show are necessary, the principal
financial support should come from public funds. And these funds should be
supplemented, as far as possible, by private resources. Privately financed legal
aid offices should be continued to provide leadership in developing techniques
and standards of service.
Brownell eloquently states:
"The individual does not exist to serve the state. The state exists
to serve the individual. The object of law is to protect the dignity and
worth of every human being, whatever his income. American history
demonstrates that our national strength is founded on individual oppor-
tunity and freedom.
"If law is to fulfill its important mission, the facilities of Legal Aid
in the United States must be materially strengthened, for here is the
tested and exclusive means of assuring that every citizen stands equal
before the law."
My only regret is that an otherwise excellent study should be marred by
differences of opinion among the members of the Survey Council on an issue
which does not exist.
ALEx ELSONt
SOviET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY. Translated by Hugh W. Babb. Introduction
by John N. Hazard. 20th Century Legal Philosophy Series: Vol. V.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951. Pp. 456. $7.50.
WHEN the American Council of Learned Societies sponsored its translation
of Vyshinsky's The Law of the Soviet Union many turned to it with high
hopes of finding an exposition of the basic premises and intellectual currents
of Soviet legal thought. But its 750 pages of tedious formal description, in-
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terspersed with virulent abuse, effectively dispelled those hopes. The Council's
current offering, Soviet Legal Philosophy, should more than recompense the
professional and lay reader for the previous disappointment. This volume is
composed of seven major selections from leading Soviet jurists, representa-
tive of each stage of Soviet development from the Revolution to the present.
The editors have interpolated shorter pronouncements by Lenin, Stalin and
Vyshinsky, each designed to state official political dogma to which the changes
in legal theory correspond. Professor Hazard's excellent introductory essay
provides biographical sketches, and relates each selection to the historical and
polemical context in which it was written.
I
A short introductory lecture by Lenin on the state is followed by a series
of selections first published in 1921 by Pavel Ivanovich Stuchka, organizer of
the body now known as the Institute of Law of the Academy of Social Sciences
of the U.S.S.R. His primary thesis is that society is a whole, changing and
developing according to its own laws. "Explanations" of social phenomena
must lie on the purely social level. Therefore, he urges, jurisprudence must
cease treating law either in terms of individuals or eternal values. Law is solely
a social phenomenon, a system of social relationships. "He who has under-
stood that the institutions of family, property, inheritance, purchase and sale.
and so forth are nothing but legal relationships- and consequently social
relationships of hnuman beings as well-will have his eyes open also to the
social relationships latent behind every genuinely legal clause of a statute."
The only constant factor in law is that it always "corresponds to the interests
of the dominant class and is safeguarded by the organized force of that class."
In a classless society, it follows, there can be no law. "and it is only the most
undiscriminating application of contemporary terminology to antique society
that creates illusions such as this."
Mikhail Andreevich Reisner, in the next selection contends that Stuchka's
identification of law and force is an "essentially meaningless definition." In a
bold and imaginative essay, Reisner maintains that Stuchka's denial of the
normative element in law reduces the claims of the proletariat to political and
economic importunities. They "lose all the force of an ideal robed in legal vest-
ments." The object of such works is clear: "to invest the dictatorship of the
proletariat with the decent garment of bourgeois-like law at whatever cost."
In prophetic words, Reisner warns of the results of such thinking:
"The state under the authority of the proletariat will constantly be
brought into association with the bourgeois state, and for the mass it
will be difficult to distinguish the present order from the future order.
In each of them there is the dictatorship of a definite class, the old
apparatus remains, the principles of executive authority are old, and if
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the blue policemen . . . be converted into red policemen, ... this will
entail such an affirmation of the old ideology under the banner of the
dictatorship of the proletarians, that the dictatorship will-in the shape
of a transition form-create a dictatorship of a proletarian chancellery,
police station and barracks ... "
Reisner attributes Stuchka's errors to his failure to recognize that within
the Marxist framework law is an ideological form as well as the coercive
social control of the dominant class. Marxism knows not only "dictatorship
law" but also a "right to revolution." Starting with Petrazhitskii's system of
intuitive law, he develops a theory of intuitive class law which provides the
basis of the "revolutionary consciousness" so prominent in the Soviet ideology
of the twenties. The specific indicium of law for Reisner is not coercion but
a sense of justice, in turn closely associated with the concepts of equality and
inequality-a sense of justice which is the intuitive reaction of social groups
determined by their position in the class structure. Law will disappear in'
the communist society because the source of law is class conflict in which
the ruling class invokes the concept of equality in law to hide inequality
in fact. When equality in fact is achieved, the formula of "from each accord-
ing to his ability, to each according to his need," a formula which economically
assures that which is unequal to each unequal person, will destroy law.
Unlike Reisner, who, accused of "idealizing" Marxism, had a temporary
impact, Evgenii B. Pashukanis was a major influence in Soviet legal develop-
ment. His most significant work, The General Theory of Law and Marxism,
published in 1924 and reproduced here in full, established him as a first-rate
legal thinker by any academic standards. His book develops what has conie
to be known as the "Commodity Exchange Theory of Law."'
Pashukanis starts from two fundamental Marxist premises: (1) law is an
ideological form reflecting the basic economic organization of a society, and,
(2) in communist society law and the state will wither away. Since the basic
institution of capitalistic society is exchange, bourgeois law is permeated with
the concept of exchange. Contract is king not only in the marketplace but in
criminal law, in the institution of marriage, and every other phase of bourgeois
jurisprudence. It is a mistake to view law as authoritative social control be-
cause social control in its most naked forms, such as the army or slavery, is
precisely the opposite of what we think of as law. Law emerges in society
when reciprocal relations develop between individuals each of whom has cer-
tain rights and duties. The basic legal concept, therefore, is the legal subject
who possesses rights and duties. He is only the juristic aspect of the economic
man in the market-place. Modern theory is wrong in deriving individual
1. See, Fuller, Pashukanis and Vysitisky: A Study in the Development of Marxian
Legal Theory, 47 MIcH. L. REV. 1157 (1949).
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rights from the legal order, because the legal order exists to protect the in-
dividual's rights as a trader, rights that precede law.
The essence of bourgeois law, Pashukanis maintains, does not lie in its use
as a means of exploitation, as the instrument of the ruling classes, because
class domination can exist without law. Its essence lies in the particular form
of capitalist exploitation: the idea that the relations of capitalist and worker
are established through contract, through exchange of commodities in the
market.
Since the conception of law postulates reciprocal relationships between
autonomous individuals, it follows that it is only with the development of
capitalism that a fully developed legal system can emerge. In fact, there it
no law except bourgeois law. And, so long as economic exchange e%ists with-
in a socialist society, its law will remain bourgeois. Only when all exchange
has been eliminated and replaced by the system of "from each according to
his ability, to each according to his needs" will the legal superstructure dis-
appear. Ian will no longer be an autonomous end in himself-the economic,
legal and moral trader-but will be transformed into a wholly social animal
whose self-interest is identified with that of the social group.
In the late twenties, Pashukanis. then the leading spokesman of Soviet juris-
prudence, came under heavy attack as a follower of the discredited Bukharin
theory of the withering away of state and law. This was the period of the
Five-Year Plans, the rise of Hitler, the Stalin Constitution. the Soviet aban-
donment of the policy of world revolution in favor of collective security abroad
and of building socialism in one country at home. Modifying his earlier posi-
tion, Pashukanis sought to adapt himself to the new orthodoxy which recog-
nized the necessity of the stabilization rather than the withering away of law.
But the attempt was unsuccessful, and he finally fell victim to the l938 purges.
The final selections in this collection are from an authoritative legal text-
book written in 1940, and from the journal of the U.S.S.R Academy of
Sciences in 1945. Starting from Stalin's conclusions that communism could
exist in one country and that under prevailing world conditions the state as
an instrument of compulsion must continue to exist and indeed be strength-
ened, they elaborate a legal theory which represents present-day Soviet ortho-
doxy. Theoretically the ultimate withering away of the state is maintained,
as is the Iarxist concept of law as the instrument of the state and the state
as the instrument of the dominant class. But the emphasis is on the gradual-
ness of the transition from capitalism to communism, on the need for flexi-
bility in theory. They look to further changes in the state directed towards
further democratization and conclude that "law is an aggregate of the rules
of human conduct, established or affirmed by the state, whose coercive force
guarantees their being put into operation to the end of defending, securing
and developing legal relationships and arrangements agreeable and advan-
tageous to the dominant class."
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II
Soviet Legal Philosophy is more than just another book for limited cir-
culation among specialists in the field of Soviet law. Social scientists, lawyers
and laymen will find it profitable reading from a wide variety of viewpoints.
The student of comparative law will be struck by the many parallels between
the disputes of the Soviet theorists and their American counterparts. The
controversy between Stuchka and Reisner, for instance, centers upon many
of the issues that have embroiled American realists and their critics. Reisner's
description of intuitive law appears to be very close to Cahn's "sense of in-
justice."'2 For the sociologist the book contains a wealth of data for current
studies in the relationships of ideology and social structure, the sociology 'of
knowledge, and problems of social change. To those convinced of the need
for cross-fertilization between law and sociology, the book can provide a
welcome stimulus to inter-disciplinary collaboration.
Above all else, however, Soviet Legal Theory fairly shouts a message that
American citizens and policy-makers can ignore only at our greatest peril.
One of the greatest dangers confronting the United States in the present
.world crisis is that we are becoming more Marxist than the Marxists them-
selves in interpreting the motives and conduct of the Soviets. 3 Many of us
have convinced ourselves that the communists are interested only in world
revolution abroad and dictatorial terror at home. In analyzing Soviet materials
we cull from the doctrinal writings every quotation that buttresses those
conclusions. Anything that does not we either ignore or pass off as expedient
dissimulation. With no slight sense of superiority we point to the predomin-
ance of vituperation and polemic over intellectual content in Soviet publica-
tions in every field. Through such an approach the innumerable complexities
and contradictions in Soviet doctrine and motivation give way to a beguilingly
simple pattern.
This book exposes the folly of such oversimplification. It reminds us once
again that the essence of Marxist thinking has always been its emphasis on
movement: "Our teaching is not dogma ... Life will show us ... We know
the direction . . . But only the experience of millions, as they move to the
task, will discover the road."
4
If present-day Soviet doctrine presents a dismal canvas, it also contains a
ray of hope. If Pashukanis can be replaced by Vyshinsky, if the fundamental
belief that all law is capitalist law and soon to disappear can be replaced by
the belief in the necessity of stabilizing and strengthening Soviet law, if world
revolution can give way to socialism in one country and that in turn give
2. CAHN, THz SENSE OF INJUSTICE (1949).
3. Fuller, szpra note 1. Professor Fuller has emphasized this point but it beirs
reiteration here.
4. Lenin, quoted by MAYNARD, RUSSIA IN FLUX 1 (1948).
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way to world revolution again, then there is good reason to expect that with
future changes in social conditions will come further changes in doctrine.
Our task is two-fold. We must strengthen our efforts in every direction to
bring about those changed conditions throughout the world which will force
the Soviets to reconsider their position. That task is well under way. The
more difficult task remains. We must resist the temptation to relieve ourselves
from the fearsome burden of uncertainty, frustration and perplexity with which
we are faced by retreat into a certain world with simple answers. As Professor
Fuller has so cogently said, "In our present predicament, we need above all
else to keep some sense of contingency, some feeling for the pressures that
lie behind the printed page, some awareness of the complexity and the possible
internal contradictions in the motives of our potential enemy. We must have
the intellectual forbearance to let time and nature work on our side; we must
not be like the farmer in the Chinese proverb who pulled his crops out by
the roots trying, as he explained, 'to help them grow.' "5
ROBERT S. WARSHAWt
CONTEmPORARY CoRREcTioN. Paul W. Tappan, Editor. New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1951. Pp. xvii, 434. $5.50.
AmONG the disabilities from which the field of correction has suffered is the
lack of a comprehensive and authoritative statement of (a) the principles
concerning crime and the behavior of convicted individuals which may be
regarded as governing the operation and planning of our various prisons and
reformatories, (b) the policies and programs in administration and treatment
which have been successful or have failed, with particular emphasis upon evalu-
ative criteria, and (c) the correctional problems which seem to bear the highest
priority.
Regular readers of such specialized publications as Federal Probation, The
Prison World, and the Proceedings of the American Prison Association may be
able to piece together trends and gain insights from the shop talk of prison
officials, but a single, systematic treatment of the whole field of correction has
scarcely existed for the present period. Contemporary Correction is designed tu
fill this gap. It is a collection of thirty-three articles almost all specially written
for this volume by thirty-one selected experts in the correctional field. These
are arranged in five sections under the headings: Correction: Preliminary
Considerations, Administrative Organization and Classification, Programs in
the Correctional Institution, Types of Correctional Institutions, and Extra-
mural Treatment.
5. Fuller, supra note 1, at 1166.
-1Member of the third year class, Harvard Law Schuml.
